Cuban Regime Reportedly Diverts Majority of US Fuel Imports to State Control

Despite United States policies aiming to foster Cuba's private sector, most of the fuel imported from US territory is reportedly ending up in the hands of the regime and its military enterprises. A petroleum refining specialist from the state company CUPET, referred to as Alejandro by Diariolasamericas.com, claims that eight out of ten liters of gasoline entering the country are controlled by the state, not by the people or the small and medium-sized enterprises (MIPYMES) that are supposedly meant to benefit.

This situation highlights a persistent challenge for Washington's sanctions, which seek to pressure the Cuban government while trying to alleviate the private sector's plight. However, in practice, state control remains strong and adaptable, according to the consulted experts.

The State's Absolute Control

Alejandro from CUPET explained to Diariolasamericas.com that, for every new sanction from the State Department, the Cuban government has already made its moves in advance. “Cuban authorities are always two steps ahead of the White House,” the expert stated. This is because Cuba operates as a “barracks economy,” where the state, the communist party, and military institutions, such as the GAESA holding group, maintain absolute control over all sectors, including sports.

GAESA, according to an investigation by El Nuevo Herald cited by Diariolasamericas.com, manages Cuba’s most profitable companies and handles secret accounts totaling nearly $18 billion. The CUPET engineer finds it naive to believe that autonomous companies exist in such a centralized system. “In Cuba, the word 'independent' is a crime,” he says, pointing out that any private business goes through a vetting process by State Security and the government before obtaining a license.

Cuban leader Miguel Díaz-Canel acknowledged in August that dialogue with the United States is stalled. He affirmed there is a willingness to talk, but that “under oppression there can be no dialogue,” according to El Mundo. This lack of diplomatic progress coincides with one of the worst economic and social crises facing the island, with an economic contraction of over 15% between 2020 and 2025, exacerbated by a US oil embargo and secondary sanctions, as reported by the same outlet.

Fuel for the Security Apparatus

The destination of imported fuel is a major point of contention. Alejandro, the CUPET specialist, argues that ordinary citizens barely benefit from it. Instead, priority is given to supplying the public order forces and the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). A report by the independent newspaper 14ymedio, published the same week as Diariolasamericas.com, confirmed that gas stations like 'El Eficiente' in Havana supply the regime's repressive apparatus.

Reporters from 14ymedio verified that this gas station supplies vehicles of Sepsa (Specialized Protection Services Company, S.A.), an entity responsible for security operations. It also supplies trucks of the Special Brigade, known as the Black Berets, and the motorcycles used by State Security agents. A source at a MININT gas station near Villa Marista, the political police headquarters, confirmed that they ensure fuel for counterintelligence officers, and when asked about its origin, he responded without hesitation: “From the States, no fuel is entering the country.”

Given the severe water crisis and prolonged power outages, Díaz-Canel approved allocating a quantity of fuel to aqueducts and, more recently, for electricity generation. However, Alejandro emphasizes that the fuel bought in the United States is not intended for these vital services; instead, the State manages it “at its convenience or keeps it in military reserves.”

MIPYMES Linked to Power and the Opaque Market

The notion that Cuban MIPYMES act autonomously is questioned by many. Alejandro is clear: “Rubio and Trump are dizzy. In Cuba, there is no border that delimits the state sector from the private. MIPYMES are not autonomous.” A CubaNet investigation published in February had already revealed that several MIPYMES linked to the Castro family and GAESA were selected to import fuel, and that most of the 150 companies that formally applied to import hydrocarbons were authorized by the State Council.

Businesses such as Agroindustrial Media Luna in Ciego de Ávila, or the Gaia Local Development Project, owned by Lisa Titolo Castro (Mariela Castro’s daughter), appear with contracts to import fuel. This suggests that import opportunities are heavily centralized and connected to the highest levels of power.

Diego, the owner of a grocery store in Havana, described fuel importation as a highly intriguing matter. The consulting firm Auge, in March, had already warned about the difficulties for private companies not authorized to acquire gasoline in the US, estimating that an isotank of 25,000 liters costs about $50,000, a figure unattainable for most local businesses. The few who manage to import do so by pooling money among several entrepreneurs and always with permission from the Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Prices.

High Prices and Difficulties for Ordinary Citizens

Despite the inflow of fuel, the benefit does not easily reach the average citizen. David, a private taxi driver with an old Willy’s jeep, explained that even though informal prices have dropped, it remains unprofitable for many. A liter went from 6,000 Cuban pesos (about $10) to approximately 2,300 pesos (nearly $3), but it is still a luxury few can afford for a short trip.

A young gasoline reseller in the informal market confirmed that the fuel he moves comes from state institutions. He claims that many people licensed to buy gasoline in the United States are directly connected to the government or the regime’s “royalty,” making millions in profits. While a liter is purchased for 0.19 cents in the United States, it sells for 2,300 pesos or more in the Cuban black market, generating huge profits for a select few.

Why it matters

The dynamics of fuel importation in Cuba highlight the complex reality of international sanctions and their implementation. It shows how a centralized regime can adapt and maintain control over key resources, even those intended to benefit the population or private initiatives. For Cuban citizens, it means that access to basic services like transportation or electricity continues to depend on state decisions and an opaque market, while rhetoric about supporting the private sector clashes with a reality where the majority still struggles to make ends meet.